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THE REVITALIZATION OF THE CWA:
INTEGRATING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
POLITICAL ACTION, AND ORGANIZING
HARRY C. KATZ, ROSEMARY BATT, and JEFFREY H. KEEFE*
This case study of the Communications Workers of America (CWA) demon-
strates the value of resource dependence and contingency organizational theo-
ries—two branches of organization theory, which has most commonly been used
to interpret firm behavior—for analyzing union revitalization.  Consistent with
predictions of those theories, the CWA responded to a changed environment by
abandoning strategies that no longer achieved organizational objectives, but
retaining and bolstering strategies that continued to be effective.  Furthermore,
like the organizations analyzed in Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik’s classic
exposition of resource dependency theory, in the face of heightened environ-
mental complexity and uncertainty the CWA used political action, growth
strategies, and inter-organizational linkages to gain advantage.  The CWA
conformed to another prediction of contingency theory by using an integration
strategy—specifically, by making simultaneous and interactive use of activities
in collective bargaining, politics, and organizing—to spur innovation and re-
spond to environmental complexity and uncertainty.
*Harry C. Katz is the Jack Sheinkman Professor of
Collective Bargaining and Rosemary Batt is Associate
Professor, both at the New York State School of Indus-
trial and Labor Relations, Cornell University; Jeffrey
H. Keefe is Associate Professor at the School of Man-
agement and Labor Relations, Rutgers University.
This is a revision of a paper originally presented at the
“Symposium on Changing Employment Relations and
New Institutions of Representation” at the Sloan
School of Management, MIT, May 25–26, 1999.  The
authors are grateful to the Alfred P. Sloan Founda-
tion for generous financial support for this research
and to Danielle van Jaarsveld for able research assis-
tance.
esearch on the revitalization of the
American labor movement has focused
almost exclusively on union organizing ef-
forts (see Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Nis-
sen 1999; Turner, Katz, and Hurd 2001).
While this literature provides much inter-
esting analysis of the factors that influence
representation elections and particular or-
ganizing drives, it has not examined how
recent organizing campaigns relate to other
revitalization initiatives under way within
the American labor movement.  Similarly,
research that has assessed revitalization
steps taken by unions in activities other
than organizing (for example, Bronfen-
brenner and Juravich [2000] analyzed cor-
porate campaigns) has paid little attention
to how the various revitalization activities
interact with one another.1  Consequently,
1Bronfenbrenner and others (Bronfenbrenner et
al. 1998) have urged unions to engage in the very sort
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research has thus far failed to provide a
comprehensive examination of the strate-
gies unions are using to revitalize them-
selves and how, if at all, union activities in
one sphere of influence, such as organiz-
ing, interact with activities in other spheres,
such as collective bargaining and political
action.
This paper contributes to the literature
by examining the ways collective bargain-
ing, political action, and organizing strate-
gies interact to achieve union revitaliza-
tion.  We draw on resource dependence
and contingency theories to explain why
the success of union revitalization depends
on the adoption of new strategies and struc-
tures in response to changes in the external
environment.  Our treatment of unions as
organizations allows us to incorporate in-
sights from organization theory into indus-
trial relations theory.  At the same time, we
hope to enrich the research in organiza-
tion theory, which has focused primarily on
firms or public bureaucracies, by providing
empirical evidence from union organiza-
tions.
Insights of Organization Theory
The basic claim of contingency and re-
source dependence theories is that organi-
zations develop strategies that fit the envi-
ronmental conditions they face in order to
advance their goals.  Contingency theory
predicts that organizations will adapt their
internal organizational structure to fit the
external environment (Lawrence and
Lorsch 1969; Donaldson 2001).  In their
classic statement of resource dependence,
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) further theo-
rized that organizations are dependent on
the resources of external organizations for
their survival and therefore develop strate-
gies and structures to lessen their depen-
dence and improve their power and lever-
age vis-à-vis those organizations.  As the
environment changes, organizations adapt
their strategies to fit the new conditions.
This suggests the following hypothesis,
which we refer to as the adaptation thesis:
Hypothesis 1 (adaptation):  As their environment
changes, unions will abandon strategies and struc-
tures that no longer fit, but will retain and bolster
strategies that remain suitable.
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) also speci-
fied the strategies that organizations need
to pursue in the face of environmental
complexity and uncertainty.  These include
political action, growth strategies, diversifi-
cation strategies, and inter-organizational
linkages, all of which help to reduce re-
source dependence, enhance bargaining
power, and advance organizational goals.
In the context of private sector firms, re-
source dependence refers to firms’ depen-
dence on suppliers, customers, government
regulators, and other external agents.
Growth strategies include expanding the
volume of business and market share; di-
versification includes adopting different
business strategies or expanding business
activity across different product markets;
and inter-organizational linkages include
mergers, strategic alliances, or closer rela-
tions with suppliers or customers.
While Pfeffer and Salancik and other
organizational researchers have primarily
used resource dependence to analyze firm
strategies, it is reasonable to expect unions
to use comparable strategies to manage
environmental complexity and uncertainty.
Unions depend on the firms they have or-
ganized to engage with them in negotiating
wages and benefits for their members; and
they seek to enhance their bargaining power
vis-à-vis the firm.  For unions, political ac-
tion strategies may include internal politi-
cal mobilization of members as well as ex-
ternally oriented political activities in elec-
toral, regulatory, and legislative arenas.
Growth strategies involve a focus on orga-
nizing new members rather than focusing
exclusively on existing members.  Inter-
organizational strategies may include merg-
ers with other unions, or alliances with
of integration of collective bargaining, organizing,
and political action analyzed in this paper.  The fact
that there has been so little research examining union
integration may reflect the failure of most unions,
until recently, to heed this call.
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other union, community, or consumer or-
ganizations.  This line of argument sug-
gests the following hypothesis, which we
refer to as the diversification thesis:
Hypothesis 2 (diversification):  In response to in-
creased environmental complexity and uncertainty,
unions will use political action, growth strategies,
diversification strategies, and inter-organizational
linkages to reduce resource dependence and enhance
bargaining power.
A third dimension of organizational strat-
egy concerns the extent of specialization
and integration of activities across organi-
zational units.  Lawrence and Lorsch
(1969:8) noted that “as organizations deal
with their environment, they become seg-
mented into units, each of which has as its
own major task the problem of dealing with
a part of the conditions outside the firm.”
Where the environment becomes complex
and uncertain, Lawrence and Lorsch ob-
served that organizations turn to “integra-
tion” and “integrating mechanisms” (pp.
11, 103).  Thompson (1967) similarly ar-
gued that changes in task and technology
lead to greater “reciprocal interdepen-
dence” across the various subunits of orga-
nizations.  These predictions lead to the
following thesis, which we refer to as the
integration thesis:
Hypothesis 3 (integration):  As the environment be-
comes more complex and uncertain, unions will de-
velop integrating mechanisms to achieve organiza-
tional objectives.
A fourth dimension of organizational
strategy is the degree of centralization or
decentralization of decision-making author-
ity.  Pfeffer and Salanick finished their
analysis of resource dependence with a pre-
diction that “uncertainty will result in
greater efforts at coordination which re-
quires the concentration of power and de-
cision discretion” (1978:285).  This implies
that organizations with greater concentra-
tion of power will have better outcomes.
While this prediction is at odds with recent
trends in business organization, including
the decentralization of operational units
and supply chain management, it is consis-
tent with recent trends in the consolidation
and centralization of corporate ownership
structures.  This suggests the following the-
sis, which we refer to as the centralization
thesis:
Hypothesis 4 (centralization):  In the context of height-
ened uncertainty, unions with greater concentration
of power and decision-making will have better out-
comes than those with less concentration of power and
decision-making.
Taking the Communications Workers of
America as a test case for these four hypoth-
eses, we investigate whether changes in the
CWA’s strategies and structure conform to
the predictions of resource dependence
and contingency theories.  Our case study
of CWA revitalization makes use of exten-
sive field research in the industry; union
contracts and archival sources; aggregate
data from government sources, including
the Current Population Survey (CPS 2001)
and the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB); and our 1998 survey of a nation-
ally representative sample of 636 telecom-
munications services establishments drawn
from the Dun and Bradstreet establishment
listing.
In the next section, we begin by examin-
ing how the CWA’s environmental context
changed.  As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:1)
noted, “To understand the behavior of an
organization you must understand the con-
text of that behavior—that is, the ecology
of the organization.  Organizations are in-
escapably bound up with the conditions of
their environment.”  In particular, we ex-
amine to what extent and in what ways
environmental complexity and uncertainty
increased and, in the process, undermined
the CWA’s traditional sources of bargain-
ing power.  With a clear picture of the
nature of environmental change, we go on
in the succeeding section to examine ways
in which the CWA is modifying and inte-
grating its collective bargaining, political,
and organizing strategies to regain bar-
gaining leverage.  We next use a compara-
tive analysis of two organizational subunits
of the CWA—one at Verizon and one at
SBC Communications—to assess more fully
the integration and centralization theses.
We focus on bargaining power because it
is the key determinant of the CWA’s (and
576 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
other unions’) effectiveness.  The indus-
trial relations literature has long debated
whether unions possess a clear objective
and whether pursuit of that objective en-
tails maximizing behavior (Ross 1948;
Dunlop 194; Atherton 1973).  From this
debate and subsequent research we con-
clude that unions have two interrelated
objectives—maintaining, if not increasing,
membership and bargaining power.  Mem-
bership is desired in part for its own sake, as
one of any union’s objectives is to extend
benefits to existing and potentially expand-
ing membership.  Union membership is
also valuable because it helps support bar-
gaining leverage by, for example, increas-
ing a union’s strike leverage or political
influence.  Bargaining power is critical be-
cause it shapes the degree to which a union
can achieve improvements in working con-
ditions or other objectives (Katz and Kochan
1999:87–89).
Environmental Challenges
Confronting the CWA
The CWA has faced serious challenges
over the past two decades as a result of
product market deregulation and techno-
logical change, both of which contributed
to, and to some extent were heightened by,
the 1983 court-ordered divestiture of AT&T,
which broke up the Bell system.  This fun-
damental restructuring undermined the
union’s power, in terms of both member-
ship levels and bargaining leverage.  It also
dramatically increased the environmental
complexity and uncertainty facing the
union.
In terms of union membership and bar-
gaining leverage, prior to the break-up of
the Bell system, the union represented a
stable base of 650,000 employees at AT&T
and other telephone companies.  Post-di-
vestiture, union density among all employ-
ees in the telecommunications industry fell
from 56% in 1983 to 24% in 2001 (CPS
2001).  Union density fell because non-
union companies entered the industry and
because the Bell companies downsized the
traditional core union work force and set
up non-union subsidiaries for their growth
businesses (for example, wireless, informa-
tion services, and data communications).
The Bell companies also redefined some
technical and professional jobs as manage-
rial and excluded from collective bargain-
ing, which meant that the decline among
union-eligible workers was somewhat less.
Among union-eligible network technicians,
union rates fell from 82% in 1983 to about
57% in 2001, while among customer service
and sales workers, the drop was from 66%
to 26% (CPS 2001).
This absolute decline in membership
levels was accompanied by a redefinition of
the scope of the industry—from telecom-
munications services to the converging in-
formation services industry, which covers
content providers, such as printing and
publishing, electronic publishing, data in-
formation services, radio, broadcast, and
entertainment.  These businesses include a
wide range of technical and professional
occupations, such as radio broadcasters,
journalists, computer programmers, and
software specialists.  Thus, given these
changes, union presence in the larger in-
formation services industry is particularly
small, and the union took on the challenge
to transform itself from a telephone union
to the “union of the information age” (Bahr
1998).
The CWA also lost bargaining leverage
and faced a more complex and uncertain
environment because the break-up of the
Bell system destroyed the centralized sys-
tem of collective bargaining and stable
union-management relationships that ex-
isted at the national level; it forced a decen-
tralization in the bargaining structure.  Also,
deregulation led to ongoing corporate re-
structuring and downsizing, so that the
union faced a parade of new managers at
the bargaining table and in line positions.
This created greater complexity and uncer-
tainty in the bargaining process and in the
implementation of negotiated agreements
(Keefe and Batt 2002).
Moreover, the cost advantages of new
entrants (such as MCI and Sprint) led AT&T
and the former Bell affiliates to focus on
cost-cutting, which made contract gains
much more difficult to achieve and out-
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comes more uncertain.  With a history of
predictable and paternalistic (and arms-
length) labor relations in the old Bell sys-
tem, the CWA needed to learn how to mo-
bilize a membership accustomed to rela-
tively easy contract victories (Keefe and
Batt 1997).
In the 1990s, the union confronted in-
creasing organizational complexity and
uncertainty due to corporate mergers, as
well as the increased power and resources
of merged global entities.  Seven Regional
Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) be-
came four after Pacific Bell, Ameritech,
and Southwestern Bell merged to form SBC,
and NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, and the non-
Bell GTE merged to formed Verizon.  More-
over, non-union companies that in the 1980s
were small new entrants in the industry
became global behemoths, such as
WorldCom, which grew through a continu-
ous process of merger and acquisition (of
MCI, among other companies) (Keefe
1998).
Union Capability in Collective
Bargaining, Politics, and Organizing
To respond to this environment of height-
ened uncertainty and reduced bargaining
power, the union reassessed its strategies in
three arenas:  collective bargaining, politi-
cal action, and organizing.  In this section
we analyze how the union broadened and
deepened its activities in each of these ar-
eas, as well as developed new capabilities,
consistent with the adaptation and diversi-
fication theses.  We also show how the CWA
developed the capacity to link or coordi-
nate its activities across these areas, consis-
tent with the integration thesis.
Collective Bargaining:
Structure and Content
One of the CWA’s key collective bargain-
ing victories in the post–World War II pe-
riod was to gain a centralized collective
bargaining structure that matched the or-
ganizational structure of the national tele-
phone industry.  In doing so, the union
adapted to changes that had occurred in
the product market environment, and this
adaptation improved its bargaining lever-
age.  The CWA had been founded in 1947
as the successor to the National Federation
of Telephone Workers (a loose federation
of local unions) in order to achieve na-
tional bargaining with AT&T.  By the late
1950s, the union and AT&T informally
agreed on a two-tier system.  At the national
level, strong pattern bargaining promoted
stability in labor relations and helped stan-
dardize wages, benefits, and employment
security across the system.  At the local
level, the union bargained with each of the
22 local telephone companies over work-
place issues such as overtime policy, sched-
ules, grievances, health and safety issues,
and absence pay.
In 1974, this informal pattern of national
bargaining was replaced by formal central-
ized bargaining.  This formal structure pro-
duced Bell system–wide agreements on
wages, benefits, and employment security
and facilitated internal mobility across the
AT&T subsidiaries.  As a result, a telephone
technician received the same wage increases
whether he or she worked for AT&T or a
local Bell company in New York, California,
or anywhere in the country.  Between 1974
and 1983, the CWA and AT&T negotiated
four national contracts that greatly im-
proved the standard of living of Bell system
employees and compressed the wage struc-
ture by increasing the relative wages of the
lower-paid traditionally female jobs (Keefe
and Boroff 1994).
Post-1984, consistent with our adapta-
tion thesis, the CWA sought to continue
centralized bargaining and thereby pre-
serve a strategy that had worked well in the
past; but it found it had to modify the two-
tiered bargaining structure to fit the new
corporate environment.  Most of the Bell
companies used the event of divestiture to
demand a return to bargaining at the
local level—a fragmented structure that
would undermine union power.  The CWA
countered by pushing for two-tiered bar-
gaining at the enterprise (RBOC or
AT&T) and local operating company
level—a solution that minimized the
union’s loss of bargaining power.  All the
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RBOCs eventually accepted two-tiered col-
lective bargaining.  In addition, despite the
decentralization of bargaining to the en-
terprise level, the union continued to ne-
gotiate wages and benefits that formed a
national pattern.
The CWA also negotiated similar labor
adjustment programs, including retraining,
pension enhancements, and early retire-
ment buyouts.  The union did so by strength-
ening relationships among union leaders
and coordinating bargaining agendas across
companies.  The national pattern contin-
ued with few exceptions through the 1990s
(Keefe and Boroff 1994; Keefe and Batt
2002).  The union’s successful adaptation
to new conditions is also evident in national
CPS wage data, which show that between
1983 and 1998, real union wage levels were
maintained, but real non-union wage levels
plummeted in the highly competitive mar-
kets of the deregulated era (Batt and
Strauser 1998).
In the more complex and uncertain en-
vironment, the union’s strategies were also
consistent with the diversification thesis.
To ward off contract concessions, particu-
larly in health insurance, the CWA had to
transform itself from a business union that
made gains through union-management
cooperation in a regulated environment to
a politically oriented union that mobilized
its members to fight concessions in a tough
deregulated era.  The union developed
new capabilities for internal political ac-
tion at work—mobilizing members for con-
tract fights.  Member mobilization relies on
grassroots organizing and member-to-mem-
ber communication at work.  The aim is to
involve union members in actively repre-
senting their collective interest.  Mobiliza-
tion tactics include petitions, one-on-one
postcard messages, work-to-rule campaigns,
wearing common colors (for example, red
on Thursdays) or arm bands, expressing
solidarity through coordinated workplace
stand-ups, picket lines, electronic picket
lines, and strikes.  Mobilization also in-
cludes inter-organizational linkages with
community and consumer organizations to
support union demands, as well as external
political action in the form of public rallies
and campaigns of letter-writing to state and
local political officials.
Union Institutional Security
Another traditional source of union
power is the negotiation of institutional
security through collective bargaining.
Here again, the union sought to retain a
traditional power lever as the environment
changed.  To do so, the CWA adopted a
growth strategy and turned to political ac-
tion in the regulatory arena to assist that
strategy, as the diversification thesis pre-
dicts.  We also find that in the new complex
and uncertain environment, to retain insti-
tutional security the CWA developed a new
strategy and capability—the linking of col-
lective bargaining, organizing, and politi-
cal activities to achieve its goals—consis-
tent with the integration thesis.
Pre-divestiture, the CWA had gained in-
stitutional security by negotiating agency
shop rules, which required all employees
covered by a contract to pay union dues, in
AT&T national contracts in 1971 and 1974.
With divestiture, however, union institu-
tional security was threatened in a new way
as anti-union companies entered the indus-
try and as the former Bell affiliates set up
non-union subsidiaries.  The union re-
sponded by establishing a growth strategy
of “wall-to-wall” representation in the Bell
companies—a strategy of organizing all
union-eligible employees, including those
in the non-union subsidiaries.  The adop-
tion of this growth strategy in the face of
environmental change supports the diver-
sification hypothesis.
To gain wall-to-wall recognition, the CWA
developed an integrated strategy that linked
organizing, collective bargaining, and po-
litical activities.  The CWA first won institu-
tional security clauses in the 1990s.  These
clauses modify the basic representation elec-
tion processes embodied in the NLRA.  They
include company neutrality (the company’s
pledge not to campaign against a union
drive), expedited elections or a card check
(union recognition without an NLRB elec-
tion once union representation cards are
signed by 50% plus one of the bargaining
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unit employees, or by some higher speci-
fied percentage) to determine majority sta-
tus, organizer access to the workplace, and
the arbitration of organizing disputes.  A
full listing of institutional security clauses is
provided in Table 1.
The union gained these contract clauses,
designed to facilitate organizing, by diver-
sifying its repertoire of political activities in
the regulatory arena and linking them to
contract goals.  The companies agreed to
these clauses because they were seeking
state-level legislation to replace rate and
entry legislation with “incentive” regula-
tion.  This would make it feasible for the
companies to abolish their state-based or-
ganizations and operate as regional and
national enterprises.  The companies
needed to convince state politicians that
existing regulations were limiting new com-
petition and deployment of the informa-
tion super-highway.  The CWA agreed to
support these regulatory changes in ex-
change for explicit guarantees of union
and job security.  By the mid-1990s, the
companies also needed union political and
regulatory support for their corporate
merger activities.  This provided another
basis for agreements involving links be-
tween collective bargaining, politics, and
organizing.
In this way, consistent with our diversifi-
cation and integration theses, the CWA
managed the new environment by making
greater use of political activities and link-
ing those activities to collective bargaining
and organizing objectives.  As a result of
combining neutrality and card check agree-
ments with grassroots organizing, the CWA
gained new members in telecommunica-
tions services, as indicated in Table 2.  Be-
tween 1998 and 2002, for example, the
union organized over 12,000 workers at
Cingular Wireless (as discussed more fully
below in the SBC case), firmly establishing
the union presence in the rapidly growing
wireless telephone industry, which now
employs over 150,000 workers.  Moreover,
the organizing wins included almost 5,000
workers in southern right-to-work states
where few unions have had success.  The
union also negotiated some reductions in
outsourcing and agreements to bring tech-
nical work back into existing bargaining
Table 1.  Collectively Bargained Organizing Rights:
Neutrality, Expedited Elections, and Card Check.
Expedited
NLRB
Consent Card
Company Neutrality Elections Check Exceptions
AT&T X X 3rd party can order card check
BellSouth X X
Cingular Wireless
(owned by SBC and
BellSouth) X X
Lucent X X Wholly owned subsidiaries
Qwest (formerly US West) Accretion of 150 employees & successorship
SBC (includes Ameritech,
PacBell, SNET, SWB) X X
Verizon-East X X (in former Bell Atlantic & NYNEX)
Verizon-West X X Card check in existing areas
Verizon Wireless-East X X (Area-Bell Atlantic Mobile and former
Ameritech Properties) Language currently in
arbitration
Source:  CWA.
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units at telecommunications firms.  By con-
trast, where the CWA has undertaken
grassroots organizing without neutrality
agreements under the National Labor Re-
lations Act, it has had very limited success
(notice that the number of new union mem-
bers gained through NLRB-supervised elec-
tions reported in Table 2 is only 6,104).
It is also noteworthy that the union met
with little organizing success until the com-
panies began needing support in the regu-
latory arena.  From the early 1990s on, the
telecommunications companies needed the
union’s support for legislative and regula-
tory action while the CWA needed employer
concessions dealing with the organizing
process to increase union membership.  The
union responded by creating a reciprocal
interdependence across its previously spe-
cialized subunits responsible for collective
bargaining, political action, and organiz-
ing.  Thus, in keeping with the predictions
of resource dependence and contingency
theories, through the development of di-
versified strategies and a new linking mecha-
nism (the coordination of collective bar-
Table 2.  Private Sector Major Membership Gains for the CWA, 1985–2000.
Year Source of New Members Approx. Membership
Organizing under Neutrality, Expedited Elections, and Card Check Agreements, and Accretionsa
1986–present AT&T—Traditional 5,000
1996–present AT&T—Broadband, Wireless, & Local Service 4,500
1992–present BellSouth 500
1996–present Cingluar Wireless (SBC, Ameritech, PacTel, SNET) 12,000
1992 Qwest (formerly US West) 1,800
1992 Verizon Wireline-East 3,000
1994 Verizon Wireless-East 50
1986–present SBC Wireline (Southwest, Pacific Telesis, Ameritech) 2,200
2000 Valor Communications–GTE Spinoff 400
Subtotal 29,450
NLRB-Supervised Elections
1985–97 New members gained through NLRB-supervised representation
elections (in the telecommunications sector) 6,104
Railway Labor Act Election Win
1999 US Airways customer service representatives 10,000
Union Mergers
1982–85 Telephone independent unions in New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware 40,000
1987 International Typographical Union 25,000
1993 National Association of Broadcast Employees & Technicians 9,000
1994 The Newspaper Guild 31,000
1998 Southern New England Telephone Workers Union 6,500
1998 Independent Alliance of Publishing Employers (employees at Dow
Jones) 2,500
2000 International Union of Electrical Workers 113,000
Subtotal 227,000
Sources:  Keefe and Boroff (1994); National Labor Relations Board, CWA News; www.cwa-union.org.
aAccretion arises when an employer opens or acquires a new facility, creates a new business unit, or initiates
a new job title.  The NLRA provides that if there is interchange between existing bargaining unit employees and
the new entity, geographic proximity, integration of operations, common management of labor relations,
similarity of working conditions, and centralized administration, then the NLRB may order the entity accreted
into the existing bargaining unit without a representation election.  Alternatively, the parties may voluntarily
agree to accrete units meeting these criteria by inserting an accretion clause into their collective bargaining
agreement.
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gaining, organizing, and political activities)
the CWA countered heightened environ-
mental complexity and uncertainty.
Political Action:  Legislative
and Regulatory Initiatives
Like other unions, the CWA has a history
of political engagement at the local, state,
and federal levels in supporting a pro-labor
legislative agenda.  Facing environmental
flux and uncertainty, the CWA broadened
and deepened its political strategies.  The
deepening of the CWA’s political action is
consistent with the adaptation and diversi-
fication theses.  Moreover, a key aspect of
how the union did so, namely, through
linkages to collective bargaining and orga-
nizing, supports the integration thesis.
The CWA has long promoted its political
and regulatory objectives through public
relations and legislative lobbying and
through the creation of internal subunits,
such as the Committee on Political Educa-
tion, to encourage member participation
and funding of progressive issue campaigns
(CWA 1953, 1960).  The CWA also has
encouraged union members to vote in fa-
vor of particular issues or (mostly Demo-
cratic) candidates.  Like other unions, in
recent years the union’s political actions
have intensified and often have been coor-
dinated with the more aggressive political
agenda pursued at the AFL-CIO after John
Sweeney was elected president of the fed-
eration in 1995.
State Regulatory Involvement
In the pre-divestiture period, state regu-
lators heavily influenced the structure and
operation of the Bell system.  State Public
Service Commissions (PSCs), for example,
approved rate increases and governed rate
of return regulations for the 22 local tele-
phone companies in the AT&T system.  The
PSCs insisted on high service standards for
customers, high productivity growth that
permitted stable or declining real service
charges for business and residential cus-
tomers, and high safety standards for the
public.  The CWA played an active role at
the state level, for example, as a lobbyist
before the PSCs for telephone company
requests for rate increases made necessary
by inflation.  The union and company in-
terests coincided:  higher nominal rates
translated into continued corporate invest-
ment and growth, employment security and
higher wages and benefits for union mem-
bers, and union institutional security.
This historical link between state tele-
phone company prosperity and unionized
employment and institutional security was
supported by three conditions.  First, the
CWA (and the IBEW) had nearly complete
representation of the union-eligible em-
ployees at these companies (Batt and Keefe
1997).  Second, because of the cost-plus
type of regulations that existed at the state
level, the state telephone companies had
little incentive to pursue a labor-cost–cut-
ting strategy in order to expand profits.  If
profits were to increase, given the nature of
cost-plus regulations, the companies could
not keep those higher profits.  In this regu-
latory framework wages were viewed as a
fair and reasonable cost.  Third, the com-
missions focused their attention on univer-
sal affordable service made possible by in-
flation-adjusted rate reductions for custom-
ers.  Rate reductions were achieved through
labor productivity growth (in excess of 6%
annually), which was accomplished by con-
tinual technological innovation enabled by
a stable and well-trained labor force (Keefe
and Boroff 1994).
These conditions changed in the post-
divestiture environment because states be-
gan replacing cost-plus regulations with
incentive-based regulations (indexed price
caps and service regulations) that allowed
the RBOCs to retain the higher profits they
might earn from cost reductions.  In the
deregulated environment, the RBOCs
sought to improve profit margins by reduc-
ing labor costs and by appealing to Wall
Street as leaner enterprises that were shed-
ding their bureaucratic ways.
Nevertheless, the RBOCs still needed the
union’s political support in state legisla-
tures and at the PSCs.  In this new environ-
ment, the CWA changed its approach to
regulatory activity, and began to use its
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political support strategically to make gains
at the bargaining table.  As detailed later in
the Verizon and SBC cases, the union be-
gan opposing rate hikes and filing com-
plaints with the PSCs over service quality
and other issues—not only to improve mem-
ber welfare, but to assist in organizing cam-
paigns as well.  This provides another illus-
tration of how the CWA began to use politi-
cal action to increase its bargaining lever-
age.
National Legislative
and Regulatory Activities
Similarly, the CWA tied its political sup-
port at the federal level to union goals in
the post-divestiture period.  Historically,
the union supported the Bell system before
the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and the U.S. Congress.  For example,
in the 1970s and 1980s, the union sup-
ported AT&T’s efforts to maintain the in-
tegrity of the Bell system and lobbied long
and unsuccessfully to convince Congress to
amend the 1934 Communications Act to
protect the Bell system (Temin 1987).
After divestiture, however, the compa-
nies could not automatically count on CWA
support.  Rather, the union decided which
companies to support based on what union
members would gain in return.  In fact, the
CWA has generally supported the RBOCs
over the long distance carriers for two rea-
sons:  the overwhelming majority of CWA
members work in the RBOCs, and the long
distance carriers (including AT&T) have
pursued more aggressive anti-union strate-
gies.
The debate over deregulation of local
service markets is a case in point.  The 1996
Telecommunications Act set the terms un-
der which long distance carriers can enter
local telephone markets and vice-versa.
When Congress was debating the Act, the
CWA lobbied heavily for a version of the
law that privileged the RBOCs over the
long distance carriers, and this version pre-
vailed.  The Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) has jurisdiction over admin-
istration of the Act, and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) largely determines which
corporate mergers will proceed and under
what conditions.  The CWA has monitored
and intervened in ongoing administrative
decisions issued by the FCC and DOJ and
has engaged in other informal lobbying
efforts.  For example, the CWA argued that
the FCC and DOJ should allow mergers
among the RBOCs in order to enable these
merged partners to compete against the
other large global corporations that had
emerged in the information services sec-
tor, such as Sprint, WorldCom-MCI, AT&T,
and various foreign-based international
carriers, while it opposed the mergers of
WorldCom with MCI and of Sprint with
WorldCom (CWA 1999).
Organizing
The CWA’s traditional organizing strat-
egy was to build an industrial union of
telephone workers.  To do so, it grew by
affiliating (that is, merging) with indepen-
dent telephone employee associations and
negotiating agency shop rules, as indicated
above.  However, because the industry was
characterized by continuous technology
change, job positions regularly were being
destroyed and others created, thus requir-
ing ongoing attention to internal organiz-
ing to maintain membership levels (Beirne
1959).  In addition, much of the telecom-
munications work force was located in south-
ern and western right-to-work states.  In the
post–World War II period, the union
adapted to this environment by instructing
every local to establish an organizing com-
mittee.  Union brochures, for example,
provided guidance on how to undertake
“internal organizing” in the open shop en-
vironment of the Bell system as well as
“external” organizing of independent tele-
phone companies (CWA 1965, 1966).  As a
result, the union built and maintained
membership levels and affiliated with the
majority of independent unions in the Bell
system.  Yet, in this period, except for nego-
tiating the inclusion of agency shop provi-
sions in the contracts, the CWA’s organiz-
ing activities were carried out in a manner
largely separate from the union’s collective
bargaining or political actions.  This sepa-
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ration evaporated in the post-divestiture
era.
Two primary changes in the post-divesti-
ture period made organizing more difficult
and more important:  the loss of union
members through downsizing and the
growth of anti-union companies and non-
union subsidiaries in Bell companies in
traditional union occupations; and the col-
lapse of industry boundaries, which led to
an expansion of the scope of the industry to
include a wider range of transmission (cable
TV, wireless, Internet) and content provid-
ers (on-line publishing, data and informa-
tion services).  The union represented a
declining proportion of the traditional core
industry and only a small fraction of the
larger information services industry.  The
CWA responded in ways that are consistent
with the adaptation, diversification, and
integration theses.
First, faced with a declining presence in
the industry, the union adopted a growth
strategy.  CWA leaders believe that there
are substantial economies of scale in mem-
ber representation, and that the union must
have at least one million members to reach
its full potential.  To organize new mem-
bers in the Bell companies, as discussed
above and in the Verizon and SBC cases,
the union diversified and integrated its
activities through wall-to-wall organizing
campaigns, member mobilization, negoti-
ated neutrality and card check provisions,
political action in the regulatory arena,
and mergers with previously independent
telephone employee associations.
The CWA also is using lessons learned in
internal member mobilization to organize
among similar occupational groups in com-
panies in other industries.  For example,
drawing on its experience representing
customer service and sales workers, the CWA
is seeking to establish itself as the union for
customer service professionals.
The CWA has used member-to-member
organizing drives to create horizontal link-
ages among workers across companies.  A
good example is the union’s 1997 cam-
paign that organized 10,000 US Airways
customer service and sales agents across
the country.  In this campaign the CWA
took advantage of its dispersed geographic
work force as well as a national network of
activists in service and sales centers.  That
network, originally created to coordinate
contract bargaining and mobilization strat-
egies among CWA members, became a ve-
hicle for new member organizing.  The
union hired 25 full-time member organiz-
ers and activated its network of CWA ser-
vice and sales workers wherever there was a
US Airways airport terminal or reservation
center.  The CWA is able to do so because it
has negotiated release time for union-re-
lated work in its collective bargaining agree-
ments.  The union also compensates mem-
bers for any lost work time.  The union has
used similar grassroots mobilization and
public relations campaigns to organize the
employee associations at IBM (Alli -
ance@IBM.com) and Microsoft (WashTech-
@CWA-union.org).
To respond to the expanded scope of the
information services industry, the CWA now
refers to itself as the union of the informa-
tion economy (Bahr 1998).  Toward earn-
ing this title, the union has pursued a strat-
egy of “vertical organizing” comparable to
the vertical integration strategies being
pursued by information services firms.  As
telecommunications companies have un-
dertaken mergers among transmission and
content providers in media and arts indus-
tries, the CWA has affiliated with other
unions representing these workers, includ-
ing the Newspaper Guild, the International
Typographical Union, the National Asso-
ciation of Broadcast and Entertainment
Technicians (NABET), and the indepen-
dent association representing Dow Jones
reporters.  These union strategies conform
to Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1967:114) obser-
vation—and the diversification thesis pre-
diction—that organizations use both hori-
zontal and vertical inter-organizational link-
ages to reduce resource dependence.
In sum, the CWA has drawn on its tradi-
tional repertoires in collective bargaining,
politics, and organizing to advance mem-
ber welfare, but has also retrofitted its strat-
egies to fit the new deregulated environ-
ment, lending support to the adaptation
thesis.  The union used political action,
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growth strategies, and inter-organizational
linkages to enhance its leverage and coun-
teract environmental complexity, uncer-
tainty, and power reductions, consistent
with the diversification thesis.  Further-
more, in the post-divestiture era, the loss of
bargaining power led the union to develop
an explicit and sophisticated integration
strategy involving interconnected collec-
tive bargaining, political action, and orga-
nizing, supporting the integration thesis.
Integrating Collective
Bargaining, Politics, and
Organizing at Verizon and SBC
Verizon was formed by the merger of the
former Bell Atlantic and NYNEX in 1997,
and their merger with GTE in 2000.  SBC
was formed by the merger of Southwestern
Bell, Pacific Bell, Ameritech, and Southern
New England Telephone.  Faced with these
huge new corporate entities, the CWA’s
integration strategy linking collective bar-
gaining, organizing, and political action
became a particularly potent tool for union
power, as demonstrated in the Verizon and
SBC cases below.  The cases also provide
support for the centralization thesis:  where
the union used inter-organizational link-
ages to achieve centralized power, it was
more successful in achieving its goals.  In-
ter-organizational links included coordi-
nated activity among different regional dis-
tricts of the CWA, between the CWA and
other unions, and in the formation of stra-
tegic partnerships between the union and
management.
Verizon
In the post-divestiture period, the tenor
of union-management relations at the
former NYNEX, BellAtlantic, and GTE or-
ganizations within Verizon oscillated be-
tween intense conflict and cooperation at
all levels of the labor-management rela-
tionship.  Conflicts were driven in part by
the fact that, as at other former RBOCs, in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, union mem-
bership declined due to the factors dis-
cussed above, including non-union employ-
ment growth in new subsidiaries and the
reclassification of former bargaining unit
work into managerial job classifications.
Yet, a more cooperative tenor emerged
periodically during spells when the corpo-
ration grew.  Throughout, the CWA has
used an integration strategy to expand its
bargaining leverage.
To trace this evolution, we start with the
important conflict that occurred at NYNEX
in 1989, for in this conflict the CWA devel-
oped a full-fledged integration strategy that
served as a model for future union actions.
The key issue in the 17-week-long 1989
strike was a demand by NYNEX for signifi-
cant health care concessions, including
member co-payment.  The CWA adamantly
opposed those demands and used inter-
organizational strategies, member mobili-
zation, and political and regulatory pres-
sures to strengthen its bargaining leverage.
A critical precondition to success was an
unprecedented coalition between the CWA
and the IBEW (representing most of the
New England telephone workers), which
increased coordination between the CWA
and IBEW and increased the unions’ bar-
gaining power.  Together the unions de-
signed an effective internal mobilization
campaign, which included petitions, work-
place coordinated stand-ups, the wearing
of common colors and armbands, public
rallies, community activities, picket lines,
and a strike.
In the regulatory arena, the CWA di-
verged from its prior support for NYNEX
before the New York State PSC.  As in other
states prior to divestiture, the CWA had
regularly supported the rate increases and
other requests made by NYNEX to the New
York State PSC.  The union believed that if
the PSC delayed or lowered rate increases,
union members would suffer from result-
ing reductions in resources and employ-
ment opportunities at NYNEX.  The CWA’s
attitude changed dramatically in 1989 in
the midst of the strike the union was carry-
ing out against NYNEX.
During the 1989 strike, on a separate
front, NYNEX had proposed to the PSC
that it be allowed to raise rates and that the
earnings limitation provided under previ-
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ous regulation be replaced by incentive-
type regulations.  The union’s research
staff calculated that without those regula-
tory changes, NYNEX could hold out for
2.5 months in the strike before suffering
severe economic losses.  However, if the
PSC were to grant the company’s rate in-
crease request, the union calculated that
NYNEX would earn an additional $300
million in revenue and would be able to
hold out against a strike much longer.2
The CWA regional leadership used these
calculations to convince local union lead-
ers to support an aggressive campaign op-
posing NYNEX’s proposals before the PSC.
The local leadership agreed, and an oppo-
sition campaign was launched involving citi-
zen signatures, ads in newspapers, and fil-
ings before the New York State PSC.  The
District staff of the CWA had long wanted
to become more active in state regulatory
issues and oppose NYNEX’s requests be-
fore the PSC.  Yet, they had hesitated to do
so given the difficulties they faced in con-
vincing local union leaders that this was a
good way to use union financial resources
and that it served union member’ interests
to end the union’s traditional support of
NYNEX’s requests to the PSC.
Thus, in the midst of the 1989 strike, the
CWA forged a link between two activity
spheres, collective bargaining and political
action, for two reasons.  First, the union
aggressively resisted the requests NYNEX
made to the PSC in order to strengthen its
strike leverage at a moment when it was
searching for ways to counteract the
company’s ability to sustain service during
the strike.  The union needed additional
power levers to counter the company’s de-
ployment of supervisors to the front lines
and the intensive use of technology that
allowed the company to postpone infra-
structure maintenance.
Second, the collective bargaining–regu-
latory linkage was needed for intra-organi-
zational reasons.  The state-level union staff
needed to show local union leaders that
there were direct gains to be made in col-
lective bargaining, in this case during a
strike, to acquire those leaders’ support for
regulatory activities.  In its opposition to
NYNEX’s proposals, the CWA joined forces
with a variety of citizen action groups and a
number of county and city governments
that also opposed NYNEX’s request for a
rate increase and other regulatory changes.
This political coalition continued in the
aftermath of the strike when the CWA lob-
bied the PSC to oppose an agreement
NYNEX had negotiated with the PSC to
shift to incentive-based rate regulation and
effectively remove the profit limitations that
had existed under the previous regulatory
regime.
The CWA’s opposition to NYNEX’s pro-
posals after the strike also was linked to the
union’s efforts to convince NYNEX to rein-
state the 91 union activists involved in the
1989 strike that NYNEX was then threaten-
ing to terminate.  Here again the state-level
staff of the CWA used a concrete collective
bargaining issue (in this case, striker rein-
statement) to help convince skeptical local
union leaders that the union’s state-level
regulatory activities were worthwhile.
The final decisive element in the union’s
victorious campaign was the direct inter-
vention in the dispute of the Governor of
New York, Mario Cuomo, with whom the
CWA had a good relationship.  In personal
conversations with the CEO of NYNEX,
William Ferguson, Cuomo insisted that the
strike be settled.  The combination of pres-
sures ultimately caused NYNEX to concede.
In the end, the 1989 NYNEX strike was
settled without the introduction of medical
co-payments.
The power of coordinated bargaining
involving the CWA and the IBEW coupled
with political action paid off in the seven-
teen-week strike in 1989.  By contrast, in
1971, the CWA had been defeated in a
seven-month strike in New York that lacked
political, regulatory, and member mobili-
zation.
Another example of strategic linkages
across activity spheres appears in the events
surrounding the merger between NYNEX
and Bell Atlantic.  The CWA agreed to
2Interview with CWA Region 1 official, April 27,
1999.
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support the merger in filings it made to the
New York PSC and the federal DOJ and
FCC.  In a formal Memorandum of Agree-
ment with the CWA in 1998, Bell Atlantic
agreed to several conditions:  guarantees of
no layoffs or downgrades, no contracting
out of certain types of work, limited future
movements of work or business operations,
and other guarantees that work would be
performed by CWA-represented employ-
ees (CWA 1998a).  Here the CWA used the
threat of its potential opposition to the
merger to make substantial organizing and
collective bargaining gains.
Further linkages were established be-
tween the CWA’s political activities and its
collective bargaining during 1998 bargain-
ing with Bell Atlantic after the company’s
merger with NYNEX had been completed.
One of the key issues in 1998 Bell Atlantic
bargaining concerned the implementation
of the early retirement-pension enhance-
ment offer included in the 1994 NYNEX-
CWA labor agreement.  By April 15, 1998,
in Bell Atlantic’s northern region the two
sides had hammered out an agreement, but
the union was unwilling to sign that agree-
ment until an agreement was reached in
bargaining in Bell Atlantic’s southern re-
gion.  Bargaining in Bell Atlantic’s south-
ern region, however, stalled on three key
issues:  subcontracting, forced overtime,
and organizing rights.  Eventually a two-day
strike followed, and this in turn precipi-
tated the intervention of Bell Atlantic’s
CEO, Ivan Siedenberg.  Siedenberg quickly
accepted union-demanded provisions on
subcontracting, neutrality, and card check,
under the condition that the new contract
provisions were not extended to Bell Atlan-
tic Mobile.  The basic framework was that
the Bell Atlantic—CWA relationship was to
be standardized around the terms of the
relationship that had developed at NYNEX.
A key to this resolution was the CWA’s
agreement to support Bell Atlantic’s new
proposed merger with GTE to form Verizon.
SBC Communications
Unlike the highly combative and unstable
bargaining relationship at Verizon, the CWA
developed a sustained partnership at SBC,
with the help of centralized bargaining.  As
SBC merged with other telecommunica-
tions companies, the union built inter-or-
ganizational linkages and coordinated its
strategies across District 6 (Southwestern
Bell), District 9 (Pacific Bell), District 5
(Ameritech), and District 3 (BellSouth).
The CWA also affiliated with the previously
independent employee association at South-
ern New England Telephone (SNET) after
SBC acquired SNET in 1998.
Then, under the leadership of District 6
of the CWA, the union used inter-organiza-
tional linkages to forge a strategic partner-
ship with SBC.  The CWA District 6 has
negotiated increasingly expansive neutral-
ity and card check procedures with SBC,
and SBC in turn has gained the union’s
political support before state and federal
regulators for its merger and acquisition
activities both in the United States and
abroad.  Under these expansive procedures
the CWA has made substantial headway in
organizing and signing contracts for over
12,000 workers at Cingular Wireless, a joint
venture of SBC and BellSouth, and the
nation’s second largest wireless provider
after Verizon Wireless.
The SBC-CWA partnership emerged as
a result of a concerted union effort that
began in 1992.  While the CWA had long
supported SBC (then Southwestern Bell)
before state legislatures and PSCs, in
1992, when the union tried to organize
workers in the company’s wireless subsid-
iary, Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems,
it confronted anti-union campaigns.  The
union then explained to SBC manage-
ment that it would not continue to pro-
vide political support for the company’s
regulatory agenda or engage in coopera-
tive labor relations in the company’s tra-
ditional wireline business while SBC was
tenaciously fighting unionization in its
new subsidiaries, particularly in its wire-
less subsidiary.
During the next five years, the CWA in
District 6 undertook a sustained public and
member mobilization campaign to orga-
nize SBC Wireless.  Internally, the union
had to educate members about the strate-
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gic importance of organizing the growing
wireless business and to gain their partici-
pation in organizing campaigns.  Exter-
nally, the union conducted demonstrations,
filed board charges, and bargained hard
over its participation in SBC legislative and
regulatory affairs.  The CWA was willing to
assist the company in the regulatory arena
as long as the union was making progress
organizing the company’s wireless subsid-
iary.  In 1993, for example, SBC was press-
ing for state legislation that would regulate
providers who were trying to access the SBC
infrastructure and require them to build a
certain amount of the infrastructure in ev-
ery state served by SBC.  CWA helped SBC
pass the legislation in Kansas in exchange
for an agreement on union job growth in
the state (CWA 1997).
Later, with the passage of the 1996 Tele-
communications Act, SBC asked the CWA
to support its efforts in five states to regu-
late competitors’ access to local service.  In
1997, it also sought CWA support for its
merger with PacTel.  A breakthrough came
when, after talks with CWA leaders in Dis-
trict 6 and District 9 (representing PacTel),
SBC announced the formation of two new
subsidiaries and gave the CWA recognition
at both.  The union then negotiated a card
check agreement for the other SBC subsid-
iaries.  Subsequently a similar agreement
was extended to all U.S. subsidiaries of
SBC, even those operating outside the foot-
prints (that is, traditional geographic
boundaries) of SBC’s various regional com-
panies.  In exchange, the CWA agreed to
support the company in various regulatory,
legislative, and political forums (CWA
1998b).  Similarly, in 2001 bargaining, the
CWA made progress at the bargaining table
in the core contract at SBC contingent on
the signing of collective bargaining agree-
ments in the Cingular Wireless subsidiaries
that recently had been organized.  Later
that year, CWA District 6 coordinated with
CWA District 3 in the nine-state BellSouth
region to negotiate a card check and neu-
trality agreement for 10,000 additional
workers in Cingular Wireless who are lo-
cated in the BellSouth region (Keefe and
Batt 2002).
The CWA also has provided assistance to
SBC’s international expansion efforts.  In
the late 1990s, for example, the CWA pro-
vided critical support for SBC’s bid to par-
ticipate in the South African telephone
industry.  After gaining representation elec-
tion card check provisions, and other favor-
able agreements that would help the union’s
organizing efforts at SBC in the United
States, the president of the CWA, Morty
Bahr, supported SBC’s efforts to gain entry
to South Africa’s telephone market (Bahr
1998).  In sum, the success of CWA’s growth
strategy at SBC has been contingent on the
centralization of collective bargaining and
on the effective integration of collective
bargaining, politics, and organizing.
Conclusions
Our case study shows that divestiture and
deregulation undermined the CWA’s tradi-
tional institutional security and bargaining
power and created a much more complex
and uncertain environment in the telecom-
munications industry.  Faced with ongoing
corporate restructuring and ownership
changes, the union abandoned strategies
that no longer fit with the environment,
but continued and enhanced those that
did, consistent with the adaptation thesis
and the basic premises of resource depen-
dence and contingency theories.
The fact that the CWA turned to in-
creased political action, growth, and inter-
organizational linkages to deal with height-
ened environmental complexity and un-
certainty is also consistent with Pfeffer and
Salancik’s model of resource dependence.
The union intensified and broadened po-
litical action at both state and federal lev-
els.  It pursued growth strategies through
wall-to-wall organizing within the former
Bell affiliates, member-to-member organiz-
ing across companies, and mergers with
other unions to form a greater presence in
the information services industry.  To cre-
ate more coordinated and centralized bar-
gaining structures, the CWA also used in-
ter-organizational linkages with other
unions and strategic partnerships with the
management of the firms the union bar-
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gains with.  This lends support to the di-
versification thesis.
To enhance bargaining leverage (and
reduce resource dependence), one of the
key ways the CWA is altering its organiza-
tional structure is through an integration
strategy that involves the simultaneous and
interactive use of activities in the domains of
collective bargaining, politics, and organiz-
ing.  For example, it is through novel lan-
guage won in collective bargaining agree-
ments with the RBOCs that the CWA is
gaining card check recognition and em-
ployer neutrality in representation elec-
tions, key parts of the union’s organizing
initiative.  Similarly, internal political mo-
bilization and external political action have
been central to union contract victories.  A
key factor motivating activity integration
was the fact that the telecommunications
companies needed the union’s support for
legislative and regulatory action while the
CWA needed employer concessions deal-
ing with the organizing process to increase
union membership.
This activity integration is consistent with
Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1969:11) predic-
tion that “integrating mechanisms” will
emerge in organizations that face environ-
mental complexity and uncertainty, the
integration thesis.  In this case the CWA’s
shift to activity integration enhanced the
union’s bargaining leverage in an environ-
ment involving extensive corporate and
industry restructuring.
Our case analyses reveal that activity in-
tegration worked particularly well for the
CWA at SBC, where the union developed
the capability to centrally influence labor
relations across the corporation.  At Verizon,
in contrast, the persistent influence of di-
verse labor relations approaches at the three
“pre-merger” companies limited the extent
to which the CWA could centrally coordi-
nate activities or achieve a strategic part-
nership with the company, and this pro-
duced less successful activity integration
for the CWA.  These events support the
centralization thesis, validating the claim
of Pfeffer and Salancik regarding the vir-
tues of centralization in the face of environ-
mental complexity and uncertainty.
The organization theory literature pro-
vides extensive analysis of how organiza-
tions alter internal structures, task defini-
tions, and career paths to fit environmental
contingencies.  Burns and Stalker (1961),
for example, argued that organizations fac-
ing more uncertain and unstable environ-
ments are advantaged by “organic” internal
structures in contrast to the “mechanistic”
structures that work best in stable environ-
ments.  Our research did not examine task
definitions and organizational design within
the CWA and, as a result, cannot tell if the
union is adopting a more organic internal
structure, as organizational contingency
theory would predict.  Thus, while we find
activity integration at the CWA, it is unclear
to what extent (if any) activity integration is
leading to changes in the union’s internal
structure and in the tasks and career paths
of union staff and officers.  We see this as a
task for future research on the revitaliza-
tion under way at the CWA and other unions.
We have studied only one union and
thus cannot know if our findings generalize
to other unions.  Extending the examina-
tion to an array of unions is another task for
future research.  Still, we believe that our
analysis of CWA revitalization shows the
value of organization theory as a frame-
work for analyzing unions and union revi-
talization.
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